

Presentation
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Content

- Present state of negotiations (slides 3-5)
- Why there is this activism?: convergence of geopolitical interests of Japan and Russia (slides 6-7)
- Why There is this activism? question of Abe Shinzo's leadership (slide 8)
- What if we Abe-Putin fails? (slide 9-10)
- For QA (slides 11-14)

November 14 Singapore

- Expedite peace treaty negotiations based on 1956 Joint declaration
- Do not transfer the issue to the next generation, to put an end to this issue
- The GOJ does not explain further. So I need to give my interpretation: The only way Putting would agree is Japan's withdrawal of its long-time sovereign claim of KE → cross the Rubicon

1956 Joint Declaration Article 9

- Negotiations on the peace treaty shall be continued.
- SU, responding to Japan's request and taking into account Japan's interests, agrees to transfer HS to Japan. These islands will be actually transferred after the conclusion of peace treaty.

Peace Treaty envisaged by both

- Soviet side: London 55: transfer of HS only
- 56/2/10 London: SU=transfer of HS+ border demarcation proposal (two items are essential)
- 56/8/11 Moscow: Shigemitsu=accept transfer of HS without border; SU=flatly NO (border needs to be fixated) → position unwavering
- Japanese side: since London 55, in addition to HS, KE required → complete difference

Strategic values: Japan

- Major issue: how to handle China and US? Cannot abandon one of them. More autonomous position required to both.
- Strategic position strengthened if it has trustworthy partner. Which country may be the candidate? In North East Asia: North Korea and South Korea are not in that position now. Russia is by far the leading candidate.

Strategic values: Russia

- Relations with Europe & America = lowest point after Crimea and Ukraine
- Relations with America = Even lower point after 2016 alleged election interference; anti-Trump = anti-Putin
- → pushed to substantially better relations with China; India is a traditional natural partner; no objection, but why not have a third country ?
- → Japan is the only G7 country who continues to assert substantially better relations with Russia

Abe's leadership

- ① overcome and terminate WWII issue, realist recognition of present day world +
- ② father's legacy with Gorbachev +
- ③ grand father's legacy of autonomy to USA, 1960 revision of security treaty is Japan's efforts to revise some of inequality of previous agreements +
- ④ best conservative leader = capable of concede (Like Nixon to normalize US-China relations with Mao under cultural revolution)

What if we missed out Abe-Putin?①

- In Japan there would not be any PM, who will risk his political capital to resolve this issue and conclude PT with Russia.
- Relations may continue in business as usual, case by case decision. In economy as well as security.
- But WWII related territorial issue will stay and continues to poison the relationship for foreseeable future.

What if we missed out Abe-Putin?②

- Japan's basic position on 4 islands that Russian occupation is "unlawful" will be fully expressed
- → hence GOJ "cabinet understanding" of asking Japanese people to refrain from visiting the islands as of 89/9 will be staying quasi-eternally
- Six present day "exceptions" may or may not stay. But islands will basically prosper with Russians, Chinese, Koreans and Euro-American tourists with no or very little presence of Japanese.
- → Huge black box at North East of Hokkaido, continuing to fuel "deep rooted anger" against Russia, while symbolizing Japan's failed diplomacy.

History 1991-92

- Gorbachev's : 91/4/16 ~ 19: 4 islands issue acknowledged+ 1956 JD not acknowledged
- August GKCHP coup; December RF emerged
- Kozuirev's confidential non-existing proposal: 92/3/21, Tokyo:
- ① negotiating transfer of HS and conclude an agreement, then put it aside
- ② negotiate KE along the line of HS to have some agreement (time difference)
- ③ agreement on 4 islands and conclude a peace treaty
- → Japanese side refused; greatest missed opportunity for Japan

History 2000~01

- 93 Tokyo Declaration normalizing the process
→ a lot of efforts between Hashimoto & Yeltsin
- Putin's visit 2000/9/4, Tokyo: "56 JD is an effective agreement (I know that one of my predecessors denied at this spot)"
- Irkutsk 01/3/25: Tokyo Declaration 93 & 56 JD jointly written in a single document + HS & KE parallel negotiations (space difference) → Putin did not disagree → Japan's position disintegrated

Shigenori Togo ①

- Ambassador to SU 1938/10~1940/10; concluding armistice with Molotov on battles of Khalkhin Gol. → feeling of mutual trust
- Foreign Minister of Tojo Cabinet 1941/10~1942/9: trying to prevent the war to happen but failed.
- Foreign Minister of Suzuki Cabinet 1945/4~1945/8: Evoking real insider debate to end the war, using Russian channel for mediation; even after the Potsdam Declaration waited for Molotov's response.

Shigenori Togo ②

- Soviet attack on Japan on August 9th was a single hardest blow in his whole diplomatic life. But nevertheless, absolute unwavering conviction to end the war and trust with the Emperor allowed the Suzuki cabinet to end the war on August 15.
- What would he have to say today: “leaving the grudge because of the blow on August 9, 1945”, or “bring the Japan-Russia relationship into one of trust as he once achieved with Molotov and many other Russian colleagues?